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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




Plaintiff, ) No. 09 C 6796
)
) Judge Ruben Castillo
v.






MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Kenneth Horgan (“Plaintiff’) brings this action alleging employment discrimination and 
invasion of privacy against Timothy Simmons (“Simmons”) and Morgan Services, Inc, 
(“Morgan”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (R. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants 
unlawfully terminated him because of his disability and impermissibly inquired as to his 
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (R. 1, 
Compl. KK 21, 25-26.) In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendants invaded his privacy under 
Illinois state law. (Id. f  31.) Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 13, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss.) For the 
reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff has been diagnosed as HIV positive for the past ten years, but kept his status 
confidential, disclosing his medical condition only to his close friends, (R. 1, Compl. 8-9.) In 
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sales manager in Los Angeles. (Id. Tfc 5-6.) In January 2008, Defendants promoted him to 
General Manager of the Chicago facility. (Id. 5.) Plaintiff claims that his HIV positive status 
never interfered with his ability to perform the essential functions of his job and that he “has 
always met or exceeded Morgan’s legitimate expectations.” (Id. Tfff 10-11.) Specifically, in 
2009, Plaintiff claims he brought in a lucrative account with the company’s “biggest customer in 
the country.” (Id. r  11.)
Simmons is Morgan’s president and was Plaintiff’s supervisor in Chicago. ( I d . 7.) On 
July 15, 2009, Plaintiff alleges that Simmons asked to meet with him for what Simmons termed a 
“social visit.” (Id. 12.) During their visit, Plaintiff alleges that Simmons “told plaintiff that he 
was really worried about him.” (Id. Tf 13.) When Plaintiff responded by discussing his work 
performance, Plaintiff claims that Simmons cut him off saying “this is not about results.” (Id.) 
Plaintiff alleges that Simmons then “demanded” to know what was going on with him, telling 
Plaintiff that “if there was something medical going on, [he] needed to know.” (Id.) Plaintiff 
insisted that there was nothing that affected his ability to work. (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims 
that Simmons “continued to insist there was something physical or mental that was affecting 
[Plaintiff].” (Id. Tf 14.) Plaintiff claims he was “compelled to tell Simmons that he was HIV 
positive,” but he assured Simmons that his status did not affect his ability to do his job. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Simmons then asked him about his prognosis. (Id. c 15.) Plaintiff 
responded that “he had been HIV positive for a long time and that the condition was under 
control and that his T-cell count was over 300.” (Id.) Next, Plaintiff alleges that Simmons asked
2
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“what would happen if his T-cell count went below 200,” and Plaintiff replied that he would then 
have AIDS. (Id.) After urging Plaintiff to inform his family about his condition, Plaintiff alleges 
that Simmons asked him “how he could ever perform his job with his HIV positive condition and 
how he could continue to work with a terminal illness.” (Id. ^ 16.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims 
that Simmons told him “that a General Manager needs to be respected by the employees and have 
the ability to lead,” and indicated that he “did not know how [Plaintiff] could lead if the 
employees knew about his condition.” (Id. Tf 17.)
Simmons allegedly ended the meeting by telling Plaintiff that he needed “to recover” and 
that he should “go on vacation” and “leave the plant immediately.” (Id. ^17-18.) Simmons 
then told Plaintiff that he would discuss the situation with Morgan’s owner. (Id. 1f 18.) The next 
day, Plaintiff alleges that he received a copy of an email sent to all general managers and 
corporate staff indicating that “effective immediately” Plaintiff was “no longer a member of 
Morgan [].” (Id. r  19.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 28, 2009, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court. (R.l, Compl.) The 
complaint raises three claims: Count I alleges that Defendants terminated Plaintiff because of his 
disability in violation of the ADA; Count II alleges that Simmons’ July 15, 2009 questioning was 
an impermissible medical inquiry in violation of the ADA; and Count III alleges a state law claim 
for invasion of privacy. (Id.) On November 25, 2009, Defendants moved to dismiss. (R. 13, 
Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff is “unable to show a protected disability”
3
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under the ADA and that the medical-related inquiry was not prohibited because it was “job- 
related and consistent with business necessity.” (Id. at 2-3.) Further, Defendants argue that the 
complaint “lack[s] the necessary elements” to establish an invasion of privacy under Illinois law. 
(Id. at 3.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Hallinan v, 
FOP Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). In ruling on a motion to dismiss 
brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, accepting] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[ing] all inferences in her 
favor.” Regar Dev. LLCv. N a tl City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010). To survive a 
motion to dismiss, the complaint must overcome “two easy-to-clear hurdles”: (1) “the complaint 
must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is 
and the grounds on which it rests”; and (2) “its allegations must actually suggest that the plaintiff 
has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the ‘speculative 
level.’” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074,1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
ANALYSIS
I. ADA Claims
A. Count I - Termination on the Basis of Disability
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . .  terms, conditions, and privileges of
4
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employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To prevail on an ADA claim, the plaintiff must show (1) 
he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential function of the job with or without 
accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.” 
EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008), amended by, reh ’g en banc denied 
by, 554 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). The ADA defines “disability,” with 
respect to an individual, as: (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual”; (2) “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) “being 
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff alleges that he was 
terminated on the basis of his disability: being HIV positive. (R. 1, Compl.; see also R. 21, Pl.’s 
Resp. at 3.) Although Defendants acknowledge that being HIV positive is a physical 
impairment, they argue that Plaintiff has not pled “a limitation of a major life activity,” and thus 
fails to state a claim of disability under the ADA. (R. 18, Defs.’ Mem. at 10.)
Effective January 1, 2009, Congress amended the ADA to “[reinstate] a broad scope of 
protection.” See ADA Amendments Act o f2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 
3553 (2008). Specifically, Congress found that the Supreme Court had “narrowed” the 
protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, and through the AD AAA rejected the holdings of 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
5
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Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).1 Id. Although the AD AAA left the ADA’s 
three-category definition of “disability” intact, significant changes were made to how these 
categories were interpreted. Id. at 3555-56.
As relevant to this case, the AD AAA clarified that the operation of “major bodily 
functions,” including “functions of the immune system,” constitute major life activities under the 
ADA’s first definition of disability. Id. at 3555. In addition, “an impairment that is episodic or 
in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” Id. 
Congress also instructed that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted consistently 
with the findings and purposes of the [ADAAA].” Id. Noting that courts had “created an 
inappropriately high level of limitation,” the AD AAA states that “it is the intent of Congress that 
the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities 
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations . .. .” Id. at 3554. Therefore, the 
“question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not 
demand extensive analysis.” Id.
Defendants claim that even with the additional language of the AD AAA, Plaintiff fails to
1 In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that a “disability” under the ADA had to be determined with 
regard to the corrective measures that were available. 527 U.S. at 482-83. Further, the Court 
held that a person whose physical or mental impairment was corrected by medication or other 
measures did not have an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. Id. 
Subsequently, in Williams the Court held that the terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be 
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” and that to be 
substantially limited in performing a major life activity, “an individual must have an impairment 
that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives.” 534 U.S. at 197-98.
6
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plead a disability sufficient to state an actionable ADA claim. (R. 18, Defs.’ Mem. at 11-12.) 
This Court disagrees. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs favor, it is certainly plausible -  
particularly, under the amended ADA -  that Plaintiffs HIV positive status substantially limits a 
major life activity: the function of his immune system. Such a conclusion is consistent with the 
EEOC’s proposed regulations to implement the AD AAA which lists HIV as an impairment that 
will consistently meet the definition of disability. See Proposed Rules, Regulations To 
Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, As 
Amended, 74 FR 48431, at *48441 (Sept. 23, 2009) (“Interpreting the definition of disability 
broadly and without extensive analysis as required under the [ADAAA], some types of 
impairments will consistently meet the definition of disability. Because of certain characteristics 
associated with these impairments, the individualized assessment of the limitations on a person 
can be conducted quickly and easily, and will consistently result in a determination that the 
person is substantially limited in a major life activity.”).
Relying primarily on the decision in Lee’s Log Cabin, Defendants argue that a substantial 
limitation of an identifiable major life activity is “an essential basis” to establish a claim for relief
7
under the ADA.2 (Id. at 10.) In that case, the Seventh Circuit “decline[d] to adopt” a rule that 
HTV is a per se disability under the ADA,3 Lee’s Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 445. However, the 
court explicitly stated that its decision, which was decided at the summary judgment stage, 
should not “be read to suggest that the EEOC’s complaint failed to state a claim.” Lee’s Log 
Cabin, 554 F.3d at 1103. The Court finds that the level of pleading which Defendants argue is 
not required at this stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007) (“we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”) (emphasis added); see also EEOC v. Scrub, 
Inc. No. 09C4228, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99898, *5 (N.D. 111. Oct. 26, 2009) (“An employment 
discrimination case must satisfy notice-pleading requirements; specific facts establishing aprima
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2 In Lee’s Log Cabin, the EEOC alleged that the employer violated the ADA by refusing to hire 
an applicant because she had HIV. 546 F,3d at 440. The Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC’s 
attempt to substitute AIDS for HIV as the basis for the ADA claim “came too late” because the 
threshold determination of disability “turned on the extent to which [the plaintiffs] impairment 
limited her major life activities.” Id. at 444 n.4. The Seventh Circuit determined that “an AIDS 
suffer’s symptoms (and their effect on her major life activities) differ from those of someone who 
is HIV-positive,” and because “the record was silent about the effect of HIV on [plaintiff]’s life 
activities,” summary judgment in favor of the employer was appropriate. Id. at 444-45.
3 Other courts, however, have found that as a matter of law, being HIV positive is a per se 
disability under the ADA. See e.g. Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101,103 (2d Cir. 1998) (“HIV 
infection is a disability under the [ADA]”); Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, 07C5495, 2010 
U.S. Dist LEXIS 3265, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010) (“HIV infection qualifies as a disability 
under the ADA”).
8
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facie case of employment discrimination are not required.”)4
Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has overcome the “two easy-to-clear hurdles” 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss: (1) Defendants have notice of the claims and the 
grounds on which they rest; and (2) the allegations suggest that Plaintiff has a right to relief. See 
Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs first claim is therefore 
denied.
B, Count II - Impermissible Medical Inquiry
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the questions posed by Simmons on July 15, 2009, 
“constituted prohibited inquires in violation of the ADA.” (R. 1, Compl. If 26.) The ADA 
prohibits “inquiries of an employee as to whether [an] employee is an individual with a disability 
or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be 
job-related and consistent with business necessity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). Here, Plaintiff
4 Further, although Plaintiff does not argue it in his brief, the complaint also establishes a 
disability under the third definition set forth by the ADA because he was regarded as having an 
impairment. (See R. 1, Compl.) “An individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as 
having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Here, Plaintiff alleges that when he told Simmons that he was HIV 
positive, Simmons asked “how [Plaintiff] could ever perform his job with his HIV positive 
condition and how he could continue to work with a terminal illness.” (R. 1, Compl. ^  14-16.) 
In addition, Simmons allegedly told Plaintiff that “a General Manger needs to be respected by the 
employees and have the ability to lead” and that Simmons “did not know how [Plaintiff] could 
lead if the employees knew about his condition.” (Id. ^ 17.) The next day, Plaintiff alleges that 
he was terminated. (Id. Tf 19.) This Court finds that such allegations are sufficient to plausibly 
suggest that Plaintiff was terminated because Defendants regarded his HTV positive status as an 
impairment.
9
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alleges that Simmons demanded to know whether “something medical [was] going on” and 
“continued to insist there was something physical or mental that was affecting [Plaintiff].” (R. 1, 
Compl. 13,14.) Plaintiff claims that based on this questioning, he was “compelled to tell 
Simmons that he was HIV positive.” (Id. ^ 14.) Further, Simmons allegedly asked Plaintiff 
about his prognosis and what would happen if his T-cell count fell below 200. (Id. If 15.) Such 
questioning constitutes an inquiry as to whether Plaintiff had a disability and the nature and 
severity of the disability, and is thus prohibited by the ADA.5 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4); 
Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2009).
Nevertheless, Defendants argue that after Plaintiff disclosed his HIV positive status, they 
were “entitled to ask questions about the stage to which the virus had progressed because it 
related to [Plaintiff s] possible fitness to work both presently and in the future,” and that such 
questioning was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” (R. 18, Defs.’ Mem. at 9.) 
Again, Plaintiff alleges that he was “compelled to tell Simmons that he was HIV positive,” and 
disclosed this information only after an impermissible inquiry under the ADA. (R. 1, Compl. f  
14.) Further, Plaintiff s allegation that he repeatedly insisted that nothing (including his HIV 
status) affected his ability to perform his duties directly rebuts Defendants’ assertion that the
5 Defendants argue that Simmons’ alleged use of the conditional “i f ’ when initiating his 
questions signals that Plaintiff s medical problems were not the exclusive subject matter of the 
questioning. (R. 24, Defs.’ Reply at 9 n.5.) The EEOC guidelines, however, indicate that 
questions that are likely to elicit information regarding a disability are prohibited under the ADA. 
See R. 17, Pl.’s Ex. 3, “Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical 
Examinations of Employees Under the ADA” at 3 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is of no 
concern that such questioning could also elicit information regarding non-disability related 
issues.
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questioning was necessaiy to discern whether Plaintiff could “cope with the demands and 
responsibilities of his job.” (See id. Iflf 13-14; R. 18, Defs.’ Mem. at 9.)
Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim for an impermissible inquiry under the ADA 
and Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is denied,
II. State Law Claim
Finally, in Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ invaded his privacy by intruding 
upon his seclusion in violation of Illinois law. (R. 1, Compl. fflf 28-33.) Intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another is one of four torts based on an invasion of privacy. See Duncan v.
Peterson, 835 N.E.2d 411, 421 (111. App. Ct. 2005). While the Illinois Supreme Court has not 
explicitly recognized the tort of intrusion upon the seclusion of another, all of the Illinois 
Appellate Courts have recognized such a tort. See Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 874 
N.E.2d 72, 77 (111. App. Ct. 2007) (Fourth District); Johnson v. KMart Corp., 723 N,E.2d 1192,
1196 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (First District); Benitez v. KFC Nat’lMgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002, 
1033-34 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (Second District); Davis v. Temple, 673 N.E.2d 737, 744 (111. App. 
Ct. 1996) (Fifth District); Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011,1013 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (Third 
District); see also Allen v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 1997) (where the 
state supreme courts have not ruled on an issue, decisions of state appellate courts control).
Liability under the tort of intrusion upon the seclusion of another “depends upon some 
type of highly offensive prying into the physical boundaries or affairs of another person.”
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat’l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (111. 1989) (citation omitted). Thus, in
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order to state a claim, the plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) an unauthorized 
intrusion or prying into the plaintiff s seclusion, (2) the intrusion must be offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable man, (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs must be 
private, and (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering.” Burns, 874 N.E.2d at 77. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff s allegations do not satisfy the elements necessary for this claim. 
(R. 18, Defs.’ Mem. at 3-8.)
To begin, Defendants claim that Plaintiff “disclosed his condition as HIV [positive], 
without objecting or otherwise invoking any claim to confidentiality.” (Id, at 7-8.) Plaintiff, 
however, argues that the complaint illustrates that “Simmons would not take no for an answer,” 
and therefore “[i]t cannot be said that [he] authorized the disclosure of his medical condition.” 
(R. 21, PL’s Resp. at 8.) However, even if the disclosure of Plaintiff s HIV status was not 
voluntary, Defendants’ questioning does not give rise to the level of intrusion actionable under 
the tort. Compare Karracker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (C.D. 111. 2003) 
(finding that plaintiffs’ allegations of employers inquiries about personal information including 
sexual preferences and orientation, religious beliefs and practices and medical conditions were 
insufficient for a claim of intrusion upon the seclusion of another under Illinois law), and Kelly v. 
Mercoid Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (N.D. 111. 1991) (requiring an employee to submit to 
urinalysis testing does not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the seclusion of another), 
with Benitez, 714 N.E.2d at 1006 (“[ejxamples of actionable intrusion upon seclusion would 
include invading someone’s home, illegally searching someone’s shopping bag in a store,
12
eavesdropping by wiretapping, peering into the windows of a private home, or making persistent 
and unwanted telephone calls”). Therefore, Simmons’ questioning fails to establish a sufficient 
“prying” into a zone of solitude necessary to establish a claim under the tort. Accordingly, 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (R. 13) is GRANTED in part 
and DENIED in part. Counts I and II of Plaintiff s complaint remain, but Count III is dismissed. 
The parties are directed to reevaluate their settlement positions in light of this opinion and to 
exhaust all efforts to settle this case. The parties shall appear for a status on May 11, 2010 at 
9:45 a.m.
Entered:
Judge Ruben Castillo 
United States District Court
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Dated: April 12,2010
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